


# Herbert Renz-Polster

## Parenting Shapes Politics

[Erziehung prägt Gesinnung]

How the worldwide shift to the right came about –  
and how we can stop it

## Outline + Sample Translation



Psychology

Kösel

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Far right wing populism is spreading throughout the Western world. The Gaulands, Le Pens, and Wilders are raising the cry to attack the core of democracy. How could this new fanatical frugidity have come about?

Germany's best-known paediatrician and family expert set out on a sensible search for clues, and he found what he was looking for: the children. In every adult who cries out for boundaries, severity, and renewed authoritarianisms, Herbert Renz-Polster unmask an insecure child, who in his or her urge for human recognition has instead simply been abandoned. In all cultures, a certain type of authoritarian parenting style goes hand in hand with susceptibility to populist messages.

This book urgently shows that if we want to understand and hinder extreme right tendencies, we must find these unhappy childhoods. This is our social responsibility. The familial climate of today will be the political climate of tomorrow.

"Whoever wants to understand authoritarian populism must look to where small humans become large humans: childhood." *Herbert Renz-Polster*

**Herbert Renz-Polster** (MD, PhD) is a paediatrician and scientist at the Mannheim Institute for Public Health at the University of Heidelberg and has trained in both Europe and the USA. He is an editor of a well-known clinical textbook for medical students in Germany and is considered one of the most renowned voices in the questions of child development. His works *Human Children* and *Understanding Children* have permanently influenced the parenting discussions in Germany. He is the father of four children.

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## Foreword: What Does Politics Have to Do With Parenting?

*Parenting is at the heart of the matter*

The shocks just keep coming. There is a new severity in the room, a coarseness that even just a few years ago would have been inconceivable. Statements like these made by the German right-wing party's AfD co-founder Alexander Gauland are an attack on basic decency: 'We must close our borders, and then stand our ground in the face of any shocking images. We can't allow ourselves to be blackmailed by children's eyes.' And: 'It's just like plugging a leaking pipe.'<sup>1</sup>

This chill has spread in the US more than anywhere else. The man in charge there these days was once the terror of our childhood sandpits. Now half the US – once the most popular nation in the world – celebrates him as a hero, and he, Donald Trump, boasts about his ruthlessness: 'I would bring back waterboarding, and I'd bring back a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding.'<sup>2</sup>

Little blighters like that have existed since time immemorial. Our parents would give each other meaningful looks, let out a brief sigh and then find comforting words for us, such as: 'He doesn't have any friends, you know. There's nobody there for him at home.' Armed with these and similar sensible parental arguments, we gave spoilsports a wide berth. And were perhaps embarrassed for them, and whispered about them behind their backs.

In this day and age, though, we can no longer give these children a wide berth. They are coming to power ever more often, and shaping the world. It's become commonplace to regard their rise as a reaction to external circumstances. To economic, social or cultural crises.

In this book, I show that such explanations aren't helpful. We may be right to describe the jobs' triumphal procession in this way, but it doesn't change the problem. Because an attempt to explain is no approach to a solution.

When, after the fall of the German Wall, the right-wing mob marched through Saxony and elsewhere, the 'lack of jobs' was the explanation in everyone's mouth. Today, when we have full employment in Germany, they point to 'the stress of globalisation' when

right-wing populists take over the reins. However, a glance at history shows that pointing to external circumstances, crises and grievances won't get us anywhere. It wasn't the global depression that brought Hitler to power. It was *people*, with clearly defined attitudes. With clearly articulated *authoritarian convictions*.

Where do these attitudes come from? What experiences and impressions make people submit themselves to *these* of all political ideologies? *These* of all advisors and leaders? How did things go so wrong, that of all things the worst bully in the playground can now make decisions about war and peace?

The story begins where we human beings are at our smallest and most vulnerable: in childhood. It is in childhood that the moral compass is created, which then shapes our attitudes as we go through life. It is in childhood that we find out whether human interaction is about power and superiority – or, instead, about trust and collaboration. It is in childhood that we find out whether we have a voice. In childhood that we develop the social capital with which we face the world and its crises.

My book is about childhood's emotional and social legacy, which determines how we vote, and our political disposition, as adults. My primary interest lies in demonstrating that right-wing populism needs to be traced back not only to outside influences, but to psychic constants, which will only become clear when we – by making use of the relevant research – think properly about the childhoods which shape people's lives, here as well as around the world. Is there a relationship between corporal punishment in childhood, and calling for a hard-nosed politics in adulthood? We'll look at these and other such important questions.

As we examine the lines that exist between political attitudes and parents' attitudes to raising children, we'll realise why we are living in a time in which there is a growing demand for security, tidiness and delimitation. We will see that the fight isn't really about political goals, but about the path that leads to that goal. Citizens who turn their back on others and citizens who turn towards others both want the same thing – but the first kind exclude, while the second extend a hand to their fellow humans.

What seems straightforward at first has to be applied to the diverse society we live in, because black-and-white thinking won't help us to answer questions about either parenting or politics. Examining the business of politics can only help us to understand society in our time. However, by gaining an insight into our own childhoods – as well as those of Trump, Erdoğan, et al. – we'll be able to discover how best to shape the future. It is

then that we'll know what children need in order to enter life – and the election booth – confidently, and with complete faith in themselves and others.

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### **Only for Swivel-Eyed Loons?**

*The real reason for the popularity of the populists*

'You are a killer, you are a king.'

*Fred C. Trump (1905–1999), US entrepreneur*

For years, Fred Trump would drum this motto into his son Donald. The message: only those with a killer instinct can have a say. And on 19 February 2017, Donald Trump, a man who 'thinks big' in the truest sense of the word, was indeed proclaimed a kind of king in Washington, D.C. The – by economic standards – most successful society in the world has thereby elected as its leader a man for whom hard-nosed egotism is an article of faith, who despises losers and doesn't know the word 'community'. The most powerful person on Earth today, able to erase half the human population with the mere push of a button, is a man who lies without inhibition, and humiliates anyone who stands in his way. Someone for whom the concept of greatness conjures up only one thing – supremacy: 'I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody and I wouldn't lose any voters.'<sup>3</sup>

There was a time when we thought that such leaders could only come to power in a hereditary system, such as may have existed in the noble houses of the Middle Ages (while the actual business of ruling was discreetly conducted by others). Yet it isn't true. Mr Trump was democratically elected, just like the right-wing leaders of Italy, Hungary and Poland. Elected by the free citizens of modern scientific, technological and information societies. The fools are themselves conducting the business of ruling these days, and they know how to get what they want.

European societies have undergone changes that are just as fundamental, if a little less dramatically. In Germany, the new class of furious citizens has moved its usual hangout,

first into the street and then into Parliament. In some regions in Germany, the AfD can line up more followers behind them than any other party. The AfD is even the most popular party among men in the former East German states. And it drives the conservatives before it, too, who now pretty much dance to every tune played from the right. And in Austria, right-wing populists are even occupying ministerial roles. Nobody mentions coalitions between conservative and right-wing parties anymore. Many Eastern European members of the EU are sliding straight back into authoritarian nation states. Citizens who barely a generation ago spoke of democracy with tears in their eyes, look on as the independent judiciary and free press are abolished.

And in Europe too, new GA ('great again') movements are gathering behind leaders who stretch caricaturists' skills to the limit and render psychiatrists speechless. And their ideologies? They all revolve around the same topics: the threat of others – refugees, supposedly corrupt political 'elites' and their supposedly simpatico 'fake news media'. They style themselves as victims who need to rediscover their voice. Ironically, in eastern Germany – where once they pulled down walls in the name of freedom – they are now demonstrating against the 'heretics'.

We are witnessing the rise of a political guard *unable to laugh* – all the Gaulands, the Orbans, the Wilders, the Le Pens and the Kaczyńskis do is *gripe*.

We ask again: what is it that drives these movements?

### **Good reasons are not enough**

Up and down the country, they're collecting factors that are meant to explain the success of the populist movements: radical globalisation and the accompanying cultural uncertainty, the increase in inequality, a lack of proper education for those at risk of social relegation. Yes, even the 'values' themselves are being brought into it.

They are all important issues. But the explanations on which these proposals are based fall short. In a recent poll, 79% of AfD-supporters described their financial circumstances as 'good' or 'very good'. And during the 2017 elections, too, the vast majority of AfD voters had completely normal, middle-class backgrounds. Most of the Americans who voted for Trump also weren't short of either education or affordable housing. The Trump-voters on average don't belong to the less well-off sections of their communities, let

alone the poorest. On the contrary: in 2016, Trump commanded the majority of votes among all income brackets – except, that is, the lowest. According to the measure of education, too, the formula ‘right-wing populists must be idiots’ doesn’t work. Germany’s AfD-supporters are drawn from every educational background, and in particular in Germany the right-wing populist programme resonates also quite significantly among academics and other highly qualified people. In the US it’s the same: the educational level of Trump-voters hardly differed from that of Clinton-voters. In fact, the majority of white Americans with a college degree voted for Trump.

What about social justice? The idea that increasing social inequality is contributing to the right-wing populist movement needs to be taken seriously (more of this later); but we only need to glance at the party manifestos to find out how significant – or rather, how insignificant – an issue it is for the right wing. They aren’t marching into battle against inequality, but against the Islamisation of the Western world, against ‘gender ideology’ and of course against refugees. They support the flat income tax rate. And bank secrecy is of course also very important. The same goes for the supporters of a certain Donald Trump. They know that the rich today own ever bigger golf courses and bigger private jets. Only they don’t care. Rather, they see it as proof that these people have done something right. If there is someone they hate, it isn’t the rich, but the dispossessed ‘trash’. Tax exiles are fine – those fleeing poverty are the problem. If anyone’s wealth is being criticised, it’s that of the supposedly corrupt political elite.

### **Further absurdities**

I’m not suggesting that the economic, social and cultural developments of the last few years and decades haven’t played a part in recent political upheavals, only that these developments don’t suffice to explain the spread of right-wing, authoritarian currents. Whether we shed light on economic factors, list social ones, or put forward the cultural framework as an explanation for right-wing populism – there is always a missing link. There has to be a more fundamental reason for the empowerment of right-wing populism; as Hendrik Müller explains, ‘Modern populism doesn’t require precariously positioned or even desperate masses. It doesn’t need hardship to sow fear.’<sup>4</sup>



The discussion (and the hostility) focuses on issues that can apparently be 'solved' by being tough, by punishing and excluding. Me against you. Christians against Muslims, white against black, my country against your country, the true people against the enemies of the people. As if attracted by a mighty magnet, the discussions and political proposals keep veering off into the opposite track: towards competition, defence and control. *Being strict* is supplanting *caring*.

### ***From Chapter 5***

#### **The Front Lines of Parenting: Spoil or Smack?**

*How your world view shapes your idea of the child*

#### **Lakoff's approach to family**

George Lakoff, Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley, was the first scientist to conceive of politics and family life as two halves of the same coin. He was of all things a linguist, and as a former student of the legendary Noam Chomsky he was accustomed to regarding language as a reflection of deep psychological structures, and thus to think of linguistic categories and metaphors as 'revealing the mind'.<sup>5</sup> When he began researching politics in the 1980s, he applied the same approach – and immediately noticed that political concepts frequently echo family relationships: we speak of the *fatherland* and *mother country*, *homeland security*, *sister parties*, *home rule*, Big *Brother*. Perhaps the reason these words trip so lightly down the tongue, Lakoff hypothesised, is that we intuitively understand that in politics, too, we're 'playing house'.<sup>6</sup>

Their common denominator also immediately caught Lakoff's eye. Politics is essentially about ordering communal life – and where else than in the family is this negotiated more intensively and profoundly? Where else do power and authority play such an important role? How could it be any other way, then, than that the early experiences of hierarchy and conformity become part of the template that shapes our view of society as a whole? Elisabeth Wehling, a student of Lakoff's and now researcher in linguistics and

cognitive science at Berkeley, puts it in a nutshell: 'It's as children that we learn what it means to be "governed".'<sup>7</sup>

In order to answer this question, George Lakoff shone a spotlight into the political divide that's increasingly splitting western societies, and discovered that political notions really do refer stubbornly to a particular *family portrait* and its associated *parenting model*. According to his analysis, the terms used by US Democrats and Republicans can all be assigned to *one of two family models*: the 'strict father' model or the 'nurturant parent' model.

Let's take the first extreme, which dominates among right-wing conservatives: the 'strict' family. According to this model, what the parents say goes – and it's typically the father's word that counts – not least because the world is a dangerous place and life is therefore no picnic. There is a clear definition of 'right' and 'wrong', and it's the duty of the head of the family to impart this distinction to the child. The child is thus rewarded for 'good' behaviour and punished for 'bad', as a result of which the child learns to discipline itself and eventually starts doing the 'right' thing of its own accord. According to this conception, the child has to work hard and conquer its impulses in order to grow big and strong. Success in life is, according to this model, the result of self-subjugation. This notion also shapes the child's attitude towards society and other people: it sees success as the reward for, and expression of, self-discipline, and thus as a general sign of strength. This, then, also lends any competition between people a moral dimension: only when someone is in competition with others can they reveal whether they're made of the right stuff. Only a system of rivalry can separate the social wheat from the chaff.

Indeed, we encounter this family portrait even where we least expect it, that is, in international politics (which I mention here because today we're seeing the flipside of this imagery). Because it seems that nations, too, define their role and their relationship with each other according to their preferred family model. In the strict, authoritarian family model the 'developed' countries are the parents, while poorer states are the children who have to be 'developed', educated and disciplined: thus, for example, the US – as 'strict father' – considers it its duty to 'teach a lesson' to the naughty states, or perhaps to reward the well-behaved child that is India and punish the ill-behaved child that is Iran.<sup>8</sup>

That this model doesn't allow for any equality among nations is clear. Why submit to the 'weakness' of justice, if power derives from strength? Perhaps this explains why the current US government feels that a transnational legal system is downright unnatural.

Actionable treaties, rules or obligations are therefore automatically 'unfair' – because they infringe on the freedom and power of the superior 'parents'. What characterises the authoritarian world view goes for the international family, too: 'might is right'.

In short: in the 'strict' family, the child grows up in a top-down environment, where its compass is calibrated towards *the pursuit of extrinsic goals* and proving one's worth in merit-based competition.<sup>9</sup>

By contrast, in the ideal type of the 'nourishing-caring' family the child is benevolently supported in its idiosyncrasies. One responds to its needs with empathy and understanding; the different interests within the family are balanced out. The child can discover the world by itself within a safe framework, and sees itself as significant and as having a social resonance. It learns to walk in other people's shoes, and thereby internalises different perspectives. The child can make itself heard, and contribute to decisions. By learning that its needs and own impulses count, the child acquires self-confidence, and independence not only from the opinions of others, but also from motivation by external incentives.

In short: as it grows up in the 'nurturant' family, the child learns that it is valuable in itself and in a profound sense invulnerable. It learns to follow an *internal* compass.

It is precisely this that lends a political meaning to our experiences in the context of the family. Those who are raised within a nurturing *family* politics are later likely to advocate a nurturing and protective approach in actual politics: to advocate protection from exclusion, protection of citizens' rights, protection for refugees, yes, even protection of the environment. On the other hand, those who have experienced a rather 'stricter' family politics are more likely to advocate a politics that is punitive, controlling – one that doesn't see a problem in making full use of one's advantages and exploiting resources at every opportunity.

### **Between nurture and strictness**

Let's take another look at Western societies, then, to measure the true extent of this divide between the political camps and assess how fundamental it really is. In one camp, the heroes talk of strength and toughness; in the other, of needs and helping those who are weaker than us. In one camp, it's people's own fault if something goes wrong; in the other,

society's. Here they value competition, there cooperation. Here it's your own achievements that count, there it's your contribution to the collective. Here they despise minorities, there they identify with them. In one room they talk of *leadership*, in the other about *teamwork*. In one of self-sufficiency, in the other of social skills. In one about hard work, in the other of creativity and freedom. Here there is a demand for more motorways, there for better public transport. Here you do your job, there you call for the right to be part of the conversation. In the US, it is possible to predict an election result purely by looking at the most-watched TV series (I imagine it's no different in this country).<sup>10</sup> Here one talks of rules, there of relationships. Here of education, there of development. I could go on.

Of course I don't want to encourage anyone to see the whole thing in black and white. But it's very much worth asking yourself where you stand on the spectrum between these extremes. We live in a time in which we have to ask ourselves which models have imposed themselves onto our lives – perhaps without our noticing.

### **The elite paradox explained**

But Lakoff's model also offers an explanation for a phenomenon that has long bothered researchers in the field of ideology. For among right-wing populists, hate and prejudice are directed not only at 'those down there' (against minorities, and those sections of the population considered alien), but also at 'those up there' (against the mainly left-leaning economic and political elite). This valuation model clearly deviates from that of your common or garden conservatives, who rather tend towards criticising downwards. Those above them are treated with respect.<sup>11</sup>

In fact, the elite paradox can best be understood by looking once again at the 'strict father' model, where the child finds safety in subordination to external authority. Whoever takes their emotional confidence from such an orientation will look on *anything* that might question or relativise this authority as dangerous – whether the incursion comes from below or above, or wherever. This is the very reason that the new right actually looks on *every* deviating – even ambiguous – representation as suspect, whether it comes from members of the government, from judges, experts, journalists, scientists or even from artists (in Poland, even satirists are nowadays pursued in the courts).<sup>12</sup> Yes, facts in themselves seem to be so threatening to those fixated authoritarians, that they quickly replace them with

'alternative facts' or with religious, patriotic or other ideological content.<sup>13</sup> To someone who has grown up within a 'strict father' model, power and interpretative authority are always in the hands of the authoritarian leader.

### **Where to, Mr Stork?**

Our idea of what it means to be human determines our image of the child, which in turn forms the basis of pedagogic principles. That is why we meet those well-known pairs of opposites in debates about parenting, too: trust versus control, external structure versus personal relationships. All parents are located somewhere between these poles. And treat their children accordingly.

At first glance, this may seem surprising, because all parents basically raise their children with the same goal in mind: to enable the child to do the right thing. To equip it for life as part of society. To be able to deal with the challenges of the future. In this sense, to be 'successful'.

And that's where the argument starts – and what a row it is! What exactly *is* the right thing that my child is supposed to do one day? And how do I get my child to do it? And already the paths the parents take diverge once again.

Depending on where their needle points them, they either land on a more *responsive* style of parenting – orientated towards the child's needs – or a more *directive* style – orientated towards the adults' goals. The former emphasises the interpersonal (the main thing is that we get along well), the latter the behavioural (the main thing is that you act as required).<sup>14</sup> How to know where the needle of the parental compass is pointing? To answer that, we simply need to take a look behind the nursery door – what negotiations are taking place there?

### **Closeness and indulgence...**

... are what's being negotiated. How much emotional and physical closeness should parents 'allow' their child? For those on the authoritarian-conservative side, the key concern is that

the child might be 'spoilt' by having its need for intimacy and close contact pandered to. There are two reasons behind such thinking: on the one hand, there is the fear that the child could become shiftless, demanding and lazy if we handle it too 'softly' – which would be a somewhat disadvantageous preparation for life, which tends to be tough. On the other hand, the child might learn to stand up to its parents – and thus turn into one of those fearsome 'terrors'. After all, it is the parents who end up giving in to their child, for example when it demands to be lulled to sleep. Similarly widespread is the hope that the child will make better progress, if once in a while you ask it to do something that it doesn't want to – perhaps let it cry itself out, rather than picking it up straightaway to comforting it (this approach for example forms the basis of 'sleep training', employed only rarely in Germany today, but still very popular in the US and France).<sup>15</sup> The child, they say, will thus mobilise its strength and overcome its dependence on adults. On the other side, however, stand those parents who believe that if their child feels emotionally safe and content it will use such capital to foster its curiosity and conquer the world – and *thereby* grow and overcome its dependence on its parents. For such parents, then, bonding with their child doesn't contradict the development of self-reliance, but becomes, on the contrary, a jumping-off point and catalyst. Parents in this camp similarly find much pleasure in kitting out their child's nest with all the creature comforts. In this camp, they don't believe that you have to create frustration in your child in order for it to use its wings. Quite the reverse: they believe that success, not failure, makes for a self-confident and emotionally strong child.

### **Regulation and punishment...**

... are also being negotiated. In raising their children, parents with a tendency towards a fundamentally authoritarian-conservative stance focus on the concept of *conforming to the rules*. 'Boundaries' and rules are central to their approach – children are made obedient by being rewarded for desirable behaviour and punished for undesirable behaviour. In the old days, corporal punishment was the order of the day – today it's usually 'time-outs', being grumpy or withdrawing privileges ('No computer games for the rest of the day'). In the other camp, they believe in a completely different way of doing things. They assume that children will cooperate of their own accord if their needs are being met and they feel comfortable within the family. According to this thinking, if you treat your child with

compassion, kindness and generosity it will naturally become itself compassionate, kind and generous. The parents in the other camp, in turn, accuse these parents of really only wanting to be friends with their child. 'If we're not dictating and punishing, then we must be saying toddlers are free to choose not to use a car seat,' as Alfie Kohn comments.<sup>16</sup> These then counter with the accusation that the parents in the other camp are behaving like 'gardeners who are so busy repairing the garden fences that they forget all about actual gardening in the garden', as the child therapist Henning Köhler puts it.<sup>17</sup>

### **Who's right?**

Which camp is has it right lies in the eye – or heart – of the beholder, and parents are thus never simply in the wrong. But what about the children? For them, after all, what counts is neither the intention, nor the method, nor their parents' conception of what it means to be human. What counts for the child is only how much emotional security it can gain as it grows up (we'll discuss this further in Chapter 6). The best prerequisite for this is a system of parenting calibrated towards trust – this is my firm conviction and in my view the only possible interpretation of the expert literature in the field. Consequently, the best thing a child can do is beg that the stork deposits it with a set of parents on *this* side of the eternal divide!

However – and let me add this right away – it should then also very much hope that it finds a stimulating environment there as well, in which a child can grow and prove itself. Because it's quite possible to waste your childhood, even on the more beautiful side of the divide, if everything there circles around the parents' plans and entertainment programmes. Bonding without freedom doesn't work for human children.

And maybe that's the reason why even those who raise their children in an 'ideal' way don't automatically have ideal children. Whether all the parents' wishes and all their love have any effect on the child depends also on how confident and strong the parents are themselves. Whether they have shining eyes or dull eyes, whether they face the world joyfully or fearfully. True, children whose parents raise them with strictness but shining eyes may be better off than children who are raised 'responsively', but by parents who are uncomfortable in their own skin. This doesn't mean that there should be no limit to what

parents expect from their children – no, children have childlike, small load limits. But children will be generous, if their parents are inspired.

We can see, then, that there is no reason to see things only in black and white. Along with the question of the best parenting method, what also matters is the parents' lived attitude. But I don't wish any child to be raised by parents whose authoritarian stance is balanced out by various 'bonus stances' – that is no suitable model, either. In my opinion, raising a child in a responsive way as well as giving it a sense of lust for life is the best prerequisite to enable it to lead a good life, and defy the right-wing populists' line.

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(Footnotes will be completed and edited)

<sup>1</sup> As reported in *Die Welt* on 24 February 2016. Available online at <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article152596882/Gauland-vergleicht-Asylkrise-mit-Wasserrohrbruch.html> (last accessed 6 Dec 2018).

<sup>2</sup> Reported in the *Washington Post* on 8 February 2016. Available online at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/02/08/donald-trumps-answer-on-torture-is-really-out-there-even-for-trump/> (last accessed 6 Dec 2018).

<sup>3</sup> Reuters, 23 Jan 2016; see <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election/confident-trump-says-could-shoot-somebody-and-not-lose-voters-idUSMTZSAPEC1NFEQLYN> (last accessed 6 Dec 2018).

<sup>4</sup> Müller, p. 115.

<sup>5</sup> George Lakoff, *Linguistics and Natural Logic* (Ann Arbor, 1970). See also Lakoff's *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind* (University of Chicago Press, 1987).

<sup>6</sup> George Lakoff and Elisabeth Wehling.

<sup>7</sup> Interview in *ZEIT Campus*, 'Schlimmer als Hillary Clinton kann man es nicht machen' ('Hillary is making a complete hash of it'), no. 6, 4 Oct 2016. Available online at <https://www.zeit.de/campus/2016/06/sprache-politiker-hillary-clinton-linguistik-elisabeth-wehling/komplettansicht> (last accessed 6 Dec 2018).

<sup>8</sup> Elisabeth Wehling.

<sup>9</sup> Duriez, B., Vansteenkiste, M., Soenens, B., & De Witte, H. (2007), 'The Social Costs of Extrinsic Relative to Intrinsic Goal Pursuits: Their Relation With Social Dominance and Racial and Ethnic Prejudice', *Journal of Personality*, 75(4), 757–82. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2007.00456.x> (last accessed 6 Dec 2018).

<sup>10</sup> Kathrin Werner, 'Sag mir, was du schaust, und ich sage dir, ob du Trump wählst' ('Tell me what you're watching and I'll tell you whether you're voting for Trump'), *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18 November 2017. Available online at <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/medien/usa-sag-mir-was-du-schaust-und-ich-sage-dir-ob-du-trump-waehlst-1.3747241> (last accessed 6 Dec 2018).

<sup>11</sup> Conservatives and right-wing authoritarians may share a sceptical world view emphasising security; however, while conservatives care about those traditions and institutions (religious, social, or of government) designed to control the tricky human animal, right-wing authoritarians believe in submitting to a hierarchical order and a leader-figure. And it's because the authoritarian camp is unable to create a form of security out of pre-existing structures, that the authoritarian movement is by its very nature disruptive.

<sup>12</sup> Florian Hassel, 'Der Kampf der Herrschenden gegen Spott und Ironie' ('The government's fight against mockery and irony'), *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 22 May 2018. Available online at <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/meinungsfreiheit-in-polen-der-kampf-der-herrschenden-gegen-spott-und-ironie-1.3987237> (last accessed 6 Dec 2018).

<sup>13</sup> If you follow this purely identity-based safeguarding to its logical conclusion, then right-wing authoritarian populism presents us once again with pre-Enlightenment man, for whom truth is only ever a postulate.

<sup>14</sup> Of course, the same argument continues within society at large. Experts get involved (each camp has its contingent of these), as do scientists (each camp draws on different ones), and now it's become a hot topic on social media, too. They refer to theories (one camp prefers bonding theories, the other behavioural theories).



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They argue about whether someone like Michael Winterhoff is right, with his 'little terrors', or someone like Schulte-Markwort, with his 'superkids'.

<sup>15</sup> I discuss this further in *Sleep Well, Baby!* (co-written with Nora Imlau). For a summary, see <https://www.kinder-verstehen.de/mein-werk/artikel/der-kinderschlaf-auf-in-den-kampf-torrero/> (last accessed 6 Dec 2018).

<sup>16</sup> Alfie Kohn, *The Myth of the Spoiled Child* (Boston: Da Capo, 2014), p. 44.

<sup>17</sup> *Neue Blätter für Pädagogik*.